Despite public statements by Moscow and Beijing about “strategic closeness,” Russia’s attempts to attract a new wave of Chinese capital after 2022 have delivered only limited results.
According to Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, accumulated Chinese investments in Russia have shown virtually no growth since 2022 and remain at around $17.4 billion. Any changes have occurred mainly in financial services that support payments and trade, rather than in the creation of new production capacity.
What Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service stated
According to the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine (publication dated February 6, 2026), 2022 saw a one-off surge of nearly 20% (the inertia of previously approved decisions plus a “substitution effect” following the exit of Western investors). However, by 2025 this momentum had largely faded.
Key points highlighted by the FIS:
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financial services are the only segment showing significant relative growth (+50%), but these investments are focused on payment and settlement channels for bilateral trade rather than industrial greenfield projects;
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the raw materials sector (traditionally attractive to China) has even slightly declined—from $9.0 billion to $8.8 billion;
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Chinese investors are operating “within safe limits” due to sanctions and secondary sanctions risks.
Why figures for “Chinese investment” in Russia differ across sources
It is important to understand that the term “investment” in public discussions often blends different metrics: FDI stock (foreign direct investment), broader measures of accumulated investments or equity participation, instruments routed through third countries or offshore jurisdictions, financial channels, lending, and more.
A telling example: in November 2024, the Chinese ambassador to Russia, in a publication on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ platforms, estimated China’s direct investment in Russia at $10.67 billion as of the end of 2023.
This does not contradict the FIS figure of “$17.4 billion in accumulated investments,” but suggests that:
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either broader components are being counted beyond “classic” FDI stock; or
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part of the flows and structures pass through indirect jurisdictions or instruments that are reflected differently across statistical sources.
The main “stop factor”: secondary sanctions and payment risks
After sanctions pressure intensified, the banking and payment system became a key bottleneck, automatically reducing appetite for large, long-term investments—especially those involving major Chinese state-owned banks and companies.
What this means in practice (examples from international sources):
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Russian and Chinese companies and banks are forced to seek alternative payment mechanisms, including netting systems and other schemes, to reduce visibility for Western regulators and the risk of secondary sanctions;
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payment problems involving Chinese counterparties and banks have periodically intensified, with some transactions handled by less “global” regional banks that nevertheless also act cautiously;
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reputational, rating, and sanctions risks are constraining even debt instruments: Reuters has reported that fears of sanctions hinder Russian companies’ issuance of “panda bonds” (yuan-denominated bonds in China), as Chinese financial institutions are reluctant to risk access to global markets.
As a result, a pattern emerges that aligns with the FIS assessment: China supports trade and settlements but is not rushing into large capital commitments in Russia if doing so increases sanctions risks.
Why growth is concentrated in financial services rather than factories, mines, or processing
Financial “investments” (the presence of banks and settlement structures) carry a different risk profile:
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they are easier to scale up or wind down;
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they directly service trade flows;
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and, most importantly, they can be structured to minimize sanctions “triggers.”
This is why the FIS thesis appears logical: noticeable growth is occurring in financial services, but this is not about the industrialization of Russia with Chinese capital—it is about payment and settlement infrastructure.
An additional signal: China is tightening controls on grey schemes in trade with Russia (the auto case)
Another indicator of caution is Beijing’s efforts to bring order to sensitive trade channels that could attract regulatory scrutiny or pose reputational risks.
In November 2025, China officially announced stricter oversight of exports of “new cars sold as used,” including vehicles registered less than 180 days before export; the rules were set to take effect in 2026.
Against this backdrop, media reports emerged about shipments of cars destined for Russia being detained specifically for violating this approach (the “zero-mileage used cars” scheme).
This is not directly about “investment,” but it reflects a broader trend: Beijing is trying to keep its interaction with Russia within boundaries that do not create excessive legal or sanctions-related risks.
What this means for Russia
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“Chinese money” is not becoming a full-fledged substitute for the West in terms of long-term capital, technology, or large-scale investments in modernization.
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Instead, China appears to be optimizing trade and settlement mechanisms and taking selective positions where risks are manageable.
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For the Russian government, this means that even amid high-level political rhetoric, the “investment pause” may be structural: without a reduction in sanctions risks, it is difficult to expect a large-scale influx of Chinese capital.
